UCMJ Article 131g: Wrongful Interference With an Adverse Administrative Proceeding

Not every consequential proceeding in the military is a court-martial. Separation boards, boards of inquiry, administrative reduction actions, and similar processes can end a career, strip a security clearance, or impose other serious consequences without ever reaching a criminal courtroom. Article 131g of the Uniform Code of Military Justice protects the fairness of those administrative proceedings by punishing service members who wrongfully try to influence or obstruct them.

Article 131g is one of the offenses that gained its own statute when the Military Justice Act of 2016 took effect on January 1, 2019. Before that, wrongful interference with an administrative proceeding was charged as an enumerated offense under the general article, Article 134. Moving it to 10 U.S.C. 931g gave it a fixed article number and, significantly, removed the need to prove the general article’s terminal element. The conduct is now defined by the wrongful act and the intent behind it.

What the offense is

The statute reaches any person subject to the UCMJ who, having reason to believe that an adverse administrative proceeding is pending against any person subject to the code, wrongfully acts with the intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the conduct of the proceeding, or otherwise to obstruct the due administration of justice. The focus is on conduct aimed at an administrative process, as distinguished from a criminal or disciplinary case.

Elements the government must prove

To convict, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt:

  1. That the accused had reason to believe an adverse administrative proceeding was pending against a person subject to the UCMJ.
  2. That the accused wrongfully did a certain act.
  3. That the accused did so with the intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the conduct of the proceeding, or otherwise to obstruct the due administration of justice.

The intent element is the heart of the offense. The accused must have acted for the purpose of influencing or obstructing the proceeding. Actual success in interfering is not required; the wrongful act done with the prohibited intent completes the offense.

What the government must show in practice

The government generally proves the existence of, or the accused’s reason to believe in, a pending adverse administrative proceeding such as a separation board or board of inquiry. It then identifies a wrongful act directed at that proceeding and ties the act to the required intent. Recognized examples of wrongful interference include intimidating or injuring a witness or board member, bribing or attempting to bribe an official involved in the process, using force or threats to delay or prevent the communication of relevant information, and wrongfully destroying or concealing information relevant to the proceeding.

Maximum punishment

Under the Manual for Courts-Martial, the maximum punishment for a violation of Article 131g is a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for five years. For offenses committed on or after December 27, 2023, the sentence is adjudged under the revised sentencing-parameter framework, while the authorized confinement ceiling for this offense remains five years.

Defenses

Defenses frequently raised under Article 131g include:

  • No prohibited intent. If the accused did not act with the purpose of influencing or obstructing the proceeding, the central element fails.
  • Lawful authority. Acts within official duties or proper command functions, such as advising a member of rights or following regulations, are not wrongful.
  • No pending proceeding. If no adverse administrative proceeding was pending, and the accused had no reason to believe one was, the offense does not apply.
  • Lawful advocacy. Presenting evidence, arguing a position, or lawfully assisting a member in an administrative process is protected, not obstruction.

Distinctions from related offenses

The defining distinction is the type of proceeding. Article 131g applies to adverse administrative proceedings, while obstruction of justice under Article 131b applies to criminal or disciplinary cases. The two share the language of intent to obstruct the due administration of justice, but they protect different processes, and the same scheme of conduct can sometimes implicate both. Article 131g also differs from public-records tampering under Article 104, which punishes altering or destroying records regardless of any proceeding, and from retaliation under Article 132, which targets adverse actions taken against those who report wrongdoing.

Frequently asked questions

How is Article 131g different from obstruction of justice?
Obstruction of justice under Article 131b concerns criminal or disciplinary proceedings. Article 131g concerns adverse administrative proceedings, such as separation boards and boards of inquiry. The conduct is similar, but the protected process differs.

What counts as an adverse administrative proceeding?
Examples include administrative separation boards, boards of inquiry, administrative reduction actions, and similar processes that can impose serious consequences on a service member short of criminal conviction.

Does the interference have to succeed?
No. The offense is complete when the accused does a wrongful act with the intent to influence or obstruct the proceeding. Actual success in altering the outcome is not required.

What is the maximum punishment?
A dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for five years.

Can lawfully helping someone with a board be a crime?
No. Presenting evidence, making lawful arguments, and properly assisting a member are protected. The offense requires a wrongful act done with intent to obstruct, not lawful advocacy.

Sources

  • 10 U.S.C. 931g, Article 131g, Wrongful interference with adverse administrative proceeding: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/931g
  • Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 edition), Part IV: https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/2024%20MCM%20files/MCM%20(2024%20ed)%20(20240102)%20(adjusted%20bookmarks).pdf
  • United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208 (C.M.A. 1994): https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/
  • Military Attorney Joseph L. Jordan, Articles of the UCMJ

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It describes military law and procedure of public record, does not address any individual case, and does not create an attorney-client relationship.