UCMJ Article 110: Improper Hazarding of a Vessel or Aircraft

A warship driven aground by a careless watch, or a military aircraft endangered by a deliberate act, can cost lives, destroy assets worth billions, and disrupt operations far beyond the single incident. Article 110 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice addresses that danger directly. It criminalizes placing a vessel or aircraft of the armed forces in jeopardy, whether the act is intentional or negligent, and it does so without requiring that the vessel or aircraft actually be lost. Creating the danger is the wrong the article targets.

Article 110 appears at section 910 of Title 10, United States Code. Although it is historically associated with naval service, the statute was amended in 2016 to cover aircraft as well as vessels, so it now reaches both categories of armed forces asset.

Two offenses, two mental states

Article 110 defines two distinct offenses that differ chiefly in the accused’s state of mind:

  1. Willful and wrongful hazarding. A person who willfully and wrongfully hazards, or suffers to be hazarded, any vessel or aircraft of the armed forces commits this offense.
  2. Negligent hazarding. A person who negligently hazards, or suffers to be hazarded, any vessel or aircraft of the armed forces commits this offense.

The phrase “suffers to be hazarded” extends liability beyond the person who directly creates the danger to one who, having a duty to act, permits the hazard to occur. To “hazard” a vessel or aircraft is to put it in danger; the statute does not require that harm actually result.

What the government must prove

The elements depend on which theory is charged. For the willful offense, the prosecution must prove that the accused was subject to the code, that a vessel or aircraft of the armed forces was hazarded or suffered to be hazarded, and that the accused did so willfully and wrongfully. For the negligent offense, the prosecution must prove the same conduct but that the accused acted negligently, meaning a failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would have used under the circumstances.

The difference between the two theories is the heart of an Article 110 case. “Willfully” requires a specific, intentional state of mind toward the hazarding; “wrongfully” requires that the act be without legal justification or excuse. “Negligently” requires only a deviation from the standard of care that the circumstances demanded. Because the asset itself is the subject of the offense, the government must also establish that the thing hazarded was a vessel or aircraft of the armed forces rather than private property or a civilian craft.

Maximum punishment

The two offenses carry sharply different exposure. Willful and wrongful hazarding is one of the few offenses in the code that authorizes a capital sentence: the statute provides for punishment by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. Negligent hazarding is punished as a court-martial may direct, without the capital authorization. The maximum punishment for the negligent offense is set out in the Manual for Courts-Martial. In practice, capital sentences are exceptional, and most cases resolve at far less than the statutory ceiling.

Possible defenses

Defenses turn on the facts and may include that no vessel or aircraft was actually hazarded because no real danger arose, that the accused acted reasonably so that any negligence theory fails, that the conduct was carried out under lawful authority or orders, or that the accused had no duty or control over the operation that produced the hazard. For the willful offense, the absence of a willful and wrongful state of mind is central, because mere negligence does not satisfy that theory.

Causation can also be contested. Where a grounding or collision resulted from conditions outside the accused’s control, such as sudden weather, equipment failure, or the act of another, the defense may dispute that the accused’s conduct was what placed the asset in danger. The lawfulness of an order is a related issue, because conduct that creates risk while carrying out a valid command differs from conduct undertaken without authority; an order that is itself unlawful does not shield the person who follows it.

How Article 110 differs from neighboring articles

Article 110 should be distinguished from articles that punish damage to property generally. Article 108 addresses loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition of military property of the United States and is concerned with the property interest itself. Article 110 is narrower in its subject, reaching specifically vessels and aircraft of the armed forces, and it punishes the creation of danger to those assets even when no damage results. Article 113, by contrast, addresses drunken or reckless operation of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel and centers on the manner of operation rather than on endangering a particular armed forces asset.

Frequently asked questions

Does Article 110 require that the vessel or aircraft be lost or damaged?
No. The offense is complete when the asset is placed in danger. Actual loss or damage is not required, although it may bear on sentencing.

Does the article apply only to commanding officers?
No. It applies to any person subject to the code whose willful or negligent conduct hazards, or suffers to be hazarded, a covered asset. Watch standers, navigators, engineers, and others with operational responsibilities can be charged.

Does Article 110 cover aircraft?
Yes. Following the 2016 amendment, the statute expressly covers both vessels and aircraft of the armed forces.

Why does the article authorize the death penalty?
The capital authorization applies only to the willful and wrongful offense and reflects the catastrophic consequences that can follow from deliberately endangering a warship or military aircraft.

Can intoxication support a hazarding charge?
It can be relevant. Failing operational duties because of alcohol may support a negligent hazarding theory, depending on the facts, though impaired operation itself is addressed by Article 113.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It describes military law and procedure of public record, does not address any individual case, and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Sources

10 U.S.C. § 910, Article 110: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/910
10 U.S.C. § 910 (U.S. House, Office of the Law Revision Counsel): https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section910
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Part IV (Punitive Articles), Joint Service Committee on Military Justice: https://jsc.defense.gov/
Military Attorney Joseph L. Jordan, Articles of the UCMJ